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Information, Litigation, and Common Law
Evolution
Keith N. Hylton, Boston University

It is common in the legal academy to describe judicial decision trends leading to
new common law rules as resulting from conscious judicial effort. Evolutionary
models of litigation, in contrast, treat common law as resulting from pressure
applied by litigants. One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaining
how trends in judicial decisions favoring one litigant, and biasing the legal standard, could occur. This article presents a model in which an apparent bias in the
legal standard can occur in the absence of any effort toward this end on the part of
judges. Trends can develop favoring the better-informed litigant whose case is also
meritorious. Although the model does not suggest an unambiguous trend toward
efficient legal rules, it does show how private information from litigants becomes
embodied in common law, an important part of the theory of efficient legal rules.

1. Introduction
It is common in the legal academy to describe trends in judicial decisions,
both those favoring plaintiffs and those favoring defendants, as the result of
conscious judicial effort. For example, Horwitz (1977) argued that the
formulation of the negligence standard over the early nineteenth century
occurred because judges wanted to subsidize the emerging railroad industry.
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Evolutionary models of litigation, in contrast, treat common law rules
as resulting from pressure applied by litigants. Judges play a passive role in
this view. If the law moves in a direction favoring a group of defendantssay, railroads-it is merely a by-product of the types of cases litigated to
judgment, not any conscious effort on the part of judges to subsidize any
particular type of potential defendant.
One apparent difficulty in the theory of litigation is explaining how longterm trends in judicial decisions favoring one litigant, and biasing the legal
standard, could occur. Under the prevailing theory of litigation, that of
Priest and Klein (1984), litigation is driven largely by uncertainty, so that
litigated cases are as unpredictable as coin tosses.' It would seem unlikely
under this model for long-term trends favoring any particular class of
litigant to occur. To return to Horwitz's argument, under the uncertainty
model of Priest and Klein, it seems unlikely that a large body of negligence
law, providing several special rules favorable to railroad defendants, would
have emerged from a process in which decisions favoring defendants were
just as likely as those favoring plaintiffs. Indeed, some have argued that
courts were corrupted by powerful interest groups such as the railroads
during the early nineteenth century (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003).
This article presents a model, which includes Priest-Klein as a special
case, in which an apparent bias in the legal standard can occur in the absence
of any effort toward this end on the part of judges. Trends can develop
favoring the better-informed litigant (i.e., the litigant who knows whether
the defendant violated the legal standard) whose case is also meritorious. To
return to the Horwitz argument, uninformed plaintiffs might sue railroads,
unsure, given the size and complexity of such organizations, whether the
railroad acted negligently. Informed railroads that are innocent of violating
the legal standard tend to stay in court all they way to judgment and win. As
a result, they have a disproportionate influence on the developing legal
standard. This gives rise to an appearance that courts favor railroads.
Because this article's model includes Priest-Klein as a special case, the
sort of unbiased short-run rule evolution suggested by Priest-Klein is also
1. Perhaps I should describe Priest-Klein as the prevailing positive theory, since
it aims to explain observed patterns of litigation and has been treated in empirical
papers as the prevailing theory (see Waldfogel, 1998). Other theories of litigation
stress informational asymmetry (Bebchuk, 1984), and overoptimism (Shavell,

1982).
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suggested in this model. Apparently unbiased rule evolution occurs when
neither plaintiff nor defendant has a significant informational advantage in
litigation. In contrast, apparently biased rule evolution occurs under
informational asymmetry.
The model presented here has implications for the literature on the
evolution of efficient legal rules. The key analysis in the modern literature
is that of Rubin (1977), which argues that common law rules tend toward
efficiency over time. This article's model does not suggest an unambiguous movement toward economically efficient legal rules; however, it
does show how private information becomes embodied in legal rules.
This is an important part of an older theory of efficient legal rules that
can be traced to Hume (1737, pp. 484-501), Hayek (1963, pp. 35-54), and
Leoni (1961). Hayek, in particular, stressed the importance of the common law process as a method of discovering private information on
efficient norms.
Section 2 describes the literature on the economics of common law
evolution. Sections 3 and 4 present the model. Section 5 summarizes the
empirical support for the model, and section 6 discusses its implications for
common law evolution.

2. Literature Review
The economic literature on legal evolution begins with Rubin (1977), to
be followed immediately by Priest (1977). Rubin argued that common law
tends toward efficient legal rules. The reason for this tendency is that
inefficient legal rules create deadweight losses. The gains to the parties
who benefit as a result of a switch from an inefficient to an efficient rule
exceed the losses of parties who prefer the inefficient rule. Given this, a
party with a long-term stake in the efficiency of the rule has a relatively
large incentive to litigate, until the inefficient rule is reversed.2
Rubin's theory can be framed in terms of litigants' stakes. Asymmetric
stakes cause parties to litigate at different rates over the long term. Since

2. Goodman (1979) presents an alternative version of this argument in which
the party with a long-term interest in the efficient rule spends more in litigation. The
party that spends more increases its chance of success in litigation. For empirical
evidence on the common law efficiency hypothesis, see Mahoney (2001).
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potential beneficiaries of the efficient rule have greater stakes than
nonbeneficiaries, they have stronger incentives to challenge inefficient rules.3
More recent essays have offered a "bidding theory" in place of Rubin's
efficiency theory.4 Under the bidding model, common law moves in a
direction that favors the parties that are best able to devote resources to
litigate in favor of their preferred rules. Thus, even if Rule A is inefficient,
courts may be driven to adopt it if its beneficiaries have an advantage over
others in organizing and devoting resources to litigation.
Both the efficiency theory of Rubin and the bidding theory of more
recent articles focus on litigation stakes. If no one had a long-term interest
in the formulation of the legal rule (e.g., in a world without repeat players
in litigation), then there would be no evolutionary pressure on legal rules
under either theory.
An alternative approach to legal evolution focuses on the information content of court decisions. Priest (1980) is the first to approach
legal evolution from this perspective. 5 Priest questions the likelihood
that efficient rules would emerge from the litigation process. Working
with the core insights of the later-formalized Priest-Klein model (1984),
Priest argued that the disputes most likely to go all the way to judgment (rather than settle early) were those in which the outcome is most
uncertain-like coin tosses. Given the high uncertainty associated with
fully litigated cases, the short-run evolutionary push provided by new
cases is unpredictable.
A clearer sense of Priest's argument might be conveyed by considering a
vague legal standard, stated in general terms, such as the negligence
standard. A particular practice is challenged as negligent. The challenge
is more likely to go to judgment, according to Priest, if the standard's
3. An alternative long-run efficiency story recently advanced in Zywicki (2003)
focuses on the "supply side" of the law. During much of the formative period of the
common law, English courts competed to attract litigants, since their revenues
depended on court filings. Competition, in turn, led courts to adopt efficient law.
4. See Hirshleifer (1982), Bailey and Rubin (1994), and Rubin, Curran, and
Curran (2001). For a related model, see Fon and Parisi (2003). For a review of these
theories, see Rubin (2003). In contrast to the bidding theory models, Gennaioli and
Shleifer (2005) present a model of evolution in the presence of biased judges that
does not necessarily result in efficient rules.
5. Another essay on legal evolution that focuses on information is Hadfield
(1992), which argues against efficiency.
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application to the particular practice is highly uncertain-in the sense
that the plaintiff and the defendant appear equally likely to win. Uncertainty is resolved in favor of plaintiffs just as often as it is resolved in
favor of defendants, so there appears to be no biasing of the standard
over time.
The model in this article builds on and formalizes the approach of
Priest (1980) by reexamining the extent to which general standards are
biased by the new information from court decisions. The appearance of
information biasing does occur in this model. Under certain conditions, uncertainty tends to be resolved in favor of defendants, and
under other conditions it tends to be resolved in favor of plaintiffs.
To observers, the cloud of uncertainty appears to shift in favor of one
of the parties.
The key difference between this model and that of Priest is that this one
allows for asymmetric information among litigants. 6 Information biasing
of the legal standard occurs in favor of the party who is both informed (i.e.,
has a superior prediction of the case outcome) and meritorious. The reason
is that informed and nonmeritorious parties (e.g., guilty defendants) tend
to settle, which leaves a relatively large share of the informed and meritorious litigants in the pool of cases litigated all the way to judgment. As a
result, the information content of legal rules shifts in favor of the informed
and meritorious party.
One can think of the model here as one of "microevolution" because it
focuses on short-run changes in the information content of the legal
6. Other works that examine the influence of asymmetric information on
litigation outcomes are Bebchuk (1984), Hylton (1993), Shavell (1996), and Hylton
(2002). The last three are especially relevant because they examine implications for
trial outcome statistics, such as frequency of plaintiff victory. One may well ask
what this article contributes to these earlier works. First, this one provides a simple
general model that incorporates asymmetric information models, the model of

Priest (1980), the model of Priest and Klein (1984), and the model of Rubin
(1977). The key results of these models are easily derived within this article's
framework. Unlike the asymmetric information models in Bebchuk (1984), Shavell
(1996), and Hylton (2002), this one dispenses with modeling strategic behavior,
which greatly simplifies the analysis. Second, unlike the earlier essays, this one
establishes general results that have clear implications for the development of case
law (e.g., the development of efficient or inefficient legal rules, as shown in section
6.B.). By incorporating the models of Priest (1980) and Rubin (1977), this article
provides an integrated model of short- and long-run legal evolution.
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standard. The stakes models, in contrast, focus on long-term evolutionary
(macroevolutionary) pressures. Although the implications for efficiency are
not straightforward, it should be clear that the information biasing identified
in this article's model could improve the efficiency of legal rules over time.8

3. Model
A. Basic Components
The model presented here focuses on the determinants of the frequency
of litigation. Following Priest (1980), I will treat the mathematical relationship between these determinants and the frequency of litigation as a forcing function that determines the content of the law produced by courts.
The model consists of four basic components.
The first basic component of this model is the Landes-Posner-Gould
(LPG) condition for litigation. Under the LPG model, parties choose to
litigate rather than settle a dispute if

(P, - Pd)J> C,

(1)

where C eqals the sum of the plaintiff's litigation cost (Cp) and the
defendant's litigation cost (Cd), J equals the dollar value of the judgment,
P, equals plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a verdict in his favor,
and Pd equals defendant's estimate of the probability of a verdict in
plaintiffs favor.9 I assume that the settlement cost is zero (i.e., the
7. One can compare this distinction between the information and stakes models
to that between microevolution and macroevolution in the evolutionary biology
literature. The short-run pressures identified in this model operate on the scope and
application of existing legal rules, while the long-run pressures of the Rubin model
operate on the selection among competing rules. Of course, as is true in the biology
literature, the microevolutionary pressures in this model should accumulate over time
to produce substantial changes in rules, blurring the distinction between the two types
of evolution.
8. One can think of the stakes models as describing one selection process or
mechanism under which cases are funneled into litigation. The information model
presents an alternative selection process that operates generally, even on those cases
that are driven by stakes pressure. The information biasing described here continues to operate even when stakes are asymmetric (see section 4).
9. This model, in which differences in probability estimates drive litigation,
differs from the model of Rubin (1977), in which differences in stakes drive litigation. See section 4.
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bargaining costs to reach settlement are zero). If the LPG condition (1)
holds, the set of mutually beneficial settlement agreements is empty, so the
parties choose to litigate.' 0
The second basic component of this model is the assumption that each
party's predictions can be modeled as the sum of a rational estimate and an
idiosyncratic error term
Pp = P' +sp;

(2)

Pd = P'd+Ed.

(3)

If , represents the information set of the plaintiff, and ad represents the
information set of the defendant, then P', = E(P,|Op),P'd
E(PdQd), E(sp|Qp) = 0, E(8dI d) = 0.

The third basic component of the model is a specification of the plaintiff s
and the defendant's rational estimates of the probability of a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. Let W equal the probability that the defendant in a legal
dispute violated the legal standard. Let Q, equal the probability that a
defendant who has violated the legal standard will be found innocent
(Type I judicial error). Let Q2 equal the probability that a defendant who
has not violated the legal standard will be found guilty (Type II judicial
error). So that courts are at least as accurate as coin tosses, I will assume that
1 - Qi > Q2. The plaintiffs rational estimate of a verdict in the plaintiffs
favor can be expressed as a function of the compliance and judicial-error
probabilities:
Wp (1I

P', =

where

W = E(W|Q),

P'd = Wd(1 - Qd)(I

-

QP

Qip) + (1 - Wp)Q2p,

=E(Q 1 0,p),

Q2p = E(Q 2Ip).

(4)

Similarly,

Wd)Q2d.

10. Recent literature has made advances on the LPG model by introducing
other influences on the decision to settle, such as the rate of compliance with the

law, credibility of the plaintiff's threat to sue, and informational asymmetry (see,
e.g., Hylton, 2002). By relying on the LPG framework, I am assuming that the
nonexistence of a mutually beneficial settlement is the main determinant of litigation. This assumption would be restrictive in some contexts, but not in this one. The
LPG model is appropriate here because it captures the influence of differential
perceptions in a direct and concise manner.
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I will focus on two types of information set immediately below. One is
the case in which the litigant has minimal case-specific information and,
with that minimal information, forms a rational estimate of the likelihood of a verdict on the plaintiffs side. This is the case of the uninformed litigant. The other is the case in which a litigant has private
information and knows whether the defendant complied with the legal
standard. For example, an uninformed malpractice plaintiff will know
that he has been injured but will not know whether the injury is due to the
defendant's negligence. An informed malpractice defendant will know
not only that he has injured the patient, but also whether or not he was
negligent.
In the case of the uninformed litigant, I will assume that his rational
predictions are accurate and equal to the true case-specific probabilities of
compliance and of error (given minimal case-specific information). Thus, if
the plaintiff is uninformed, his prediction is the objective probability of a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff. In essence, P, = W(1 - Qi) + (1 - W)Q 2.
Similarly, if the defendant is uninformed, Pd= W( - Q1) + (1 - W)Q2*
To simplify, let us label the objective probability of a verdict in the plaintiff's favor
v = W(1 - Qi) + (1 -W)Q 2.

(5)

If one of the parties has private information on compliance, his estimate of
W is equal to one in the case of noncompliance, or zero in the case of
compliance. Thus, to take one example, if the defendant is informed and
innocent, Pd = Pd = Q2.
The fourth basic component is a heteroscedasticityassumption regarding the error variances of the predictions. From the perspective of a
litigant, the outcome of a dispute is most uncertain when the rational
component of the litigants' prediction is equal to 1/2. This is the case in
which the outcome of the dispute is viewed by the litigant as a coin toss; the
litigant may have a great deal of information on the case, but the sum total
of his information leads him to believe that a finding of guilt (or liability) is
just as likely as a finding of innocence (nonliability). Consistent with Priest
and Klein (1984), I will therefore assume that the variance of the prediction
error term is a function of the rational component of the litigant's prediction, and that the variance reaches a maximum when the rational component is 1/2 and with minima at zero and one (see Figure 1).
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A

1

0.5

0

V=W(1-Ql

-Q2)+Q2

Figure 1. Prediction error variance as a function of the rational component of
the litigant's prediction.
IP

B. Frequency of Litigation
The probability of litigation is
f =prob((Pp-Pd)J > C),

(6)

which, given (2) and (3), is

are generated by a normal distribution with variances ad ,, respectively, and covariance p. The frequency of litigation is given by

Assume sF,and

Ed

f

I -4D{_Y

p

d)

(8)

where 0I is the cumulative distribution for the standard normal variable.
The frequency of litigation falls as the numerator inside 4) increases, and the
frequency of litigation increases as the denominator inside (Dincreases.
The heteroscedasticity assumption implies that, as the degree of uncertainty concerning the judgment increases (as reflected in the variance terms
in the denominator), the probability of litigation rises (Priest and Klein,
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1984). Given this, I will assume that the relationship between the predictionerror variances and v is such that f forms a probability density over v.I
The frequency-of-litigation function combines features from several
models of the litigation process. Note that as the cost of litigation rises,
other things equal, the probability of litigation falls, a prediction of the
Landes-Posner-Gould framework. The Priest-Klein model is also incorporated by the assumption of heteroscedastic prediction-error variances.
Overoptimism appears as a factor that generates litigation (Shavell,
1982). Overoptimism is captured by the negative correlation between prediction errors, p < 0. When the correlation between the parties' prediction
errors is negative, plaintiffs overestimate the size of the judgment while
defendants underestimate the size of the judgment.
1. Priest-Klein Case. Under the Priest-Klein model, litigation is driven by
uncertainty and the plaintiff win rate equals 50%. The reason is that only
disputes that are as uncertain as coin tosses make it all the way to judgment.
The frequency-of-litigation function is consistent with the implications
of Priest-Klein when the rational predictions of the plaintiff and the
defendant are the same

P' = P'

. In this case, the key "push factor"

leading to litigation is uncertainty, as reflected in the error variances in the
denominator of (8). The Priest-Klein model assumes uncertainty regarding
trial-outcome predictions increases as the defendant's conduct comes
closer to the legal standard, which implies that the rational component
of the trial-outcome prediction is 50% P' = Pd = 1/2).
A more precise description of the Priest-Klein theorem can be achieved
by examining the plaintiffs win rate in this model. For any given v, the
plaintiff win rate is
+ WAV)(l (1Wil=±2
)
(1 - WAfv) + WfAv)

(1 - W)f(v)Q

where Av) = 1 -

4(

Q1)

= v,

. The average plaintiff win rate takes

into account the frequency of litigation, so that

11. To be precise, f(v) = I

(9)

, where ff(v)dv = 1.
0
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1

r= jvf(v)dv

(10)

0

Given the assumptions on the error variances (reflected in Figure 1), f is
symmetric around v = 1/2. It follows that -T= 1/2.12
One captures the essence of the Priest-Klein model by assuming heteroscedastic error variances-in particular, assuming that prediction-error
variances reach a maximum when the rational prediction components
equal 50% P' = Pd = 1/2). Since the pool of litigated cases will be
dominated by those in which the rational component of the litigants'
predictions is equal to 50%, the average plaintiff win rate will be 50%.
The Priest-Klein analysis falls out of this model easily in the case of
Bernoulli predictions. Suppose
==f

l prob P'
SOprob 1 - P'

(11)

I probP'd
0 prob 1 - Pd

(12)

and
Pd =

The probability of litigation is simply P (I - P'd), which reaches its maximum at P' = Pd = 1/2. The most uncertain cases, in which the rational
trial outcome prediction is 50%, dominate the landscape of disputes.
2. Asymmetric Information Case. There are two asymmetric information
cases to consider: when the defendant has the informational advantage,
and-when the plaintiff has the informational advantage.
When the defendant has the informational advantage, the frequency of
litigation will depend on the defendant's type. If the defendant is innocent,

12. The formal argument that fr = 1/2 is in the Appendix. Although the PriestKlein proposition is generally accepted, the original article does not contain a
formal proof. The proof in the Appendix here, which shows that the Priest-Klein
result follows straightforwardly from the assumption that f is symmetric about
v = 1/2, is the only simple proof of the theorem of which I am aware.

44

American Law and Economics Review V8 NI 2006 (33-61)

P = W(l - Q1) + (I

W)Q 2 , Pd =

-

Q2, and the frequency of litigation is

(-W(1
- Q, - Q2)
2p

Fapd +-

If the defendant is guilty, P,= W(1 -Q)
the frequency of litigation is

fG

j

=

+ (1 - W)Q 2, P, = 1 -

+

Q((1W)(1Q1
- Q2)
q+

(3

d

Q1 , and

(14)

When defendants have the informational advantage, the frequency of litigation is larger for cases involving innocent defendants (i.e., f, > fG). This is
because guilty defendants settle their cases at a higher rate than the innocent.
As a result, the plaintiff win rate is pushed downward from the 50% level.
For any given noncompliance probability W, the overall frequency of
litigation is WfG + (1 f , and the plaintiffs win rate at trial is
WJG = -Q1)+l-

(15)

WfG +(I-MI

The average win rate is
I
if2

j

WGl-

Q1)+(-

WIQ2)dy.

(16)

0

The influence of innocent defendants as compared to guilty defendants on
the content of law produced by courts can be described by the ratio of the
litigation frequency functions fffG. The win rate formula implies that,
instead of a tendency toward 50%, the average win rate will tend toward
some level less than 50% (i.e., ff 2 < 1r*13
Now suppose the plaintiff has the informational advantage. There are
two cases to consider: when the plaintiff deserves to win (meritorious
plaintiff), and when the plaintiff deserves to lose (nonmeritoriousplaintiff).
In the nonmeritorious case, the plaintiff brings a claim that deserves to be

13. See the second proof in the Appendix.
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called frivolous. The plaintiff brings it because he knows that with probability Q2 he will be awarded damages by the court.
In the meritorious plaintiff case, the probability of litigation is given by

(

- Q2) )
W)(+ - Q1

f, -= (1 o

(17)

+d-2p

In the nonmeritorious case the probability of litigation is

(

fG=I

- Q -Q2
+ W(1
2
+

(18)

-2p

The "innocent" plaintiffs (i.e., the pairing between the uninformed defendant and the informed and meritorious plaintiff) likelihood of litigation is
larger than that of the "guilty" (frivolous) plaintiff, because the guilty
plaintiff tends to settle his claim. This leads to high win rates, exceeding 50%.

4. Extension to Stakes
The "core" model just presented focuses on uncertainty and information as the key push factors behind litigation. The model can be extended
easily to incorporate the stakes factor originally formalized in Rubin
(1977). Both the common law efficiency model and the more recent bidding model (which holds that common law moves in the direction favored
by the party with the greatest resources to devote to litigation) are special
cases of Rubin's stakes model.
Differential stakes can be incorporated in this model by letting the value
of the judgment depend on type, so that the difference in expected awards
is PJp - PdJd.. In addition, let J, = J + T,, Jd = J + Td, where J is the
damage award and Td (Tp) represents the present value of the defendant's
(plaintiffs) interest in the litigation (Rubin, 1977). The LPG condition,
(1), implies that litigation occurs when (Pp - Pd)Jp + Pd(Jp - Jd) > C.
In this more general formulation, the frequency of litigation is

f

"

(

-P)),
+1JP
- P ,d
- ( P IP

-

OP d

+ _3)20d -2(1 -)3)p
1r

19
(19)
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where 6 = I- ". If the plaintiff has greater stakes, 0 < 0 < 1, and if the
defendant has greater stakes 3 < 0. Clearly, if the plaintiff and the
defendant have symmetric stakes (T. = Td), this reduces to the information model of the previous section. Introducing stakes adds new results to
the model of the previous section only when stakes are asymmetric.
The results can be summarized as follows. In the Priest-Klein case, the
plaintiff win rate exceeds (is less than) 50% when the plaintiff (defendant) has
the greater stakes, which is a well-known result of the Priest-Klein model.14
In the asymmetric information case, we have instances in which the stakesbased and information-based push factors work at cross-purposes. For
example, when the defendant has the informational advantage, the plaintiff,
motivated-by his greater stakes, will litigate more frequently against guilty
defendants than in the case of symmetric stakes. Still, the results of the
asymmetric information model survive: f/fG > 1 even in the presence of
the stakes incentive (see Appendix).15

5. Empirical Support
As a general matter, the predictions of this model are borne out in the
data on plaintiff win rates (Hylton, 1993). Observed win rates frequently
differ from the 50% level predicted by the Priest-Klein model when stakes
are symmetric. Only two theories exist to explain these deviations from
50%: asymmetric stakes and asymmetric information. The asymmetric
information theory seems to be more consistent with the data.
For example, win rates for contract actions tend to be greater than
those for tort actions (Eisenberg, 1990, p. 357). This makes sense under the
asymmetric information theory. Tort actions often involve defendants with
private information on their own compliance with the legal standard.
Contract actions, in comparison, generally look at the conduct of both
parties in relation to objective rules governing offer and acceptance. Since
defendant-side informational advantage is more common in the tort setting, lower plaintiff win rates are predicted under the informational asymmetry model. The asymmetric stakes theory, on the other hand, could

14. The proof is in the Appendix. Although this is a well-known result, I am
not aware of a neat proof of it other than the one in the Appendix of this article.
15. See the Appendix.
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explain this pattern only if plaintiffs generally have greater stakes in
contract than in tort actions.
Areas of law in which defendants are likely to have a substantial informational advantage over plaintiffs report plaintiff win rates well below 50%.
Two areas in which such a disparity is observed are products liability and
medical malpractice tort actions. Products liability is governed largely by the
risk-utility standard,which is a type of negligence test that focuses on the
incremental risk and incremental utility presented by the defendant's design
in comparison with a safer alternative. The standard gives the defendant an
informational advantage over the plaintiff. Similarly, the negligence standard for medical malpractice, which is based on the doctor's compliance
with medical custom, gives the doctor an informational advantage over the
plaintiff. In both products liability and medical malpractice, plaintiff win
rates are consistently below 50% (e.g., Eisenberg, 1990).
Even within the products liability category, win rate patterns are more
consistent with the asymmetric information theory than with the asymmetric stakes theory. When the plaintiffs bring products liability claims
based on contract (e.g., a claim that the product failed to perform as
warranted) plaintiff win rates tend to be greater than 50%. 16 What explains
the difference between plaintiff win rates for product liability tort actions
(low) and product liability contract actions (high)?
The asymmetric information model suggests that the key difference
between product liability contract and product liability tort actions is
that the defendant lacks an informational advantage under the legal standards used in the contract actions. These standards come in essentially two
varieties: express and implied warranty rules. Express warranties are simply the terms of the contract, and there is no reason to believe that either
party has an informational advantage in reading the contract. However,
contract law doctrines generally favor the consumer in these cases. Since
state courts are rather idiosyncratic in this regard, it is quite possible that
lawyers on the plaintiffs side, who are more likely than the product seller's
lawyers to be familiar with the law and the behavior of juries in their
jurisdiction, generally have the best prediction of the effective legal standard. In the case of implied warranties, the court's determination of a
16. Eisenberg (1990) reports .57 in the case of contract-based actions and .25
for tort-based actions.
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contract breach will often depend on the type of use to which the consumer
put the product. In these cases, the plaintiff-consumer is again likely to
have an informational advantage.
In contrast to the asymmetric information theory, the stakes theory fails
to explain the pattern of win rates observed within the products liability
category. If defendants have greater stakes in these cases, as the stakes
theory posits, they should tend to win more often than plaintiffs both in
product liability tort actions and in product liability contract actions. But
we see the opposite in the case of product liability contract actions.

6. Implications for Common Law Evolution
The implications of this model for legal evolution are straightforward.
The direction of the law is influenced by the litigation likelihood ratio of
innocent to guilty litigants, flfG. This is so even when stakes are
asymmetric.
In the Priest-Klein case in which the rational components of the litigant's
predictions are the same, the litigation likelihood ratio is equal to one. The
results are those explained by Priest (1980), assuming stakes are symmetric.
Law does not evolve in a direction that favors any party-the guilty or the
innocent. One might describe this type of evolution as a random walk, in the
sense that the law is equally likely to move in a direction favoring plaintiffs
as it is to move in a direction favoring defendants.
The more interesting cases are the two involving asymmetric information, where the defendant has the informational advantage and where the
plaintiff has the informational advantage. In each case, the model shows
that the relative frequency of litigation favors the party who is both
informed and has the strongest case (i.e.,fI/fG > 1). Informed defendants
that are innocent, and informed plaintiffs that have meritorious claims,
are most likely to litigate to judgment and to win their cases.' 7 In this
process, the law should come over time to embody the information that
these informed parties have with respect to their types of case.
So far, this model tells a story about microevolution in which existing legal
rules are shaped, in the asymmetric information setting, by the information
provided by "innocent" litigants in court. To take a concrete example, suppose
17. Civil discovery is unlikely to erase the informational disparities in this
model (see Hay, 1995).
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we are considering a medical malpractice claim. The legal standard is negligence. Suppose the plaintiff is uninformed as to the doctor's potential compliance with the standard, while the doctor is far better informed.
This model implies that the negligence standard in medical malpractice
is infused, over time, disproportionately by the information provided by
innocent doctors. The negligence standard is somewhat ambiguous a
priori. Litigation gives the standard a definite form, in the sense that
certain types of conduct are deemed nonnegligent and other types are
deemed negligent. The case law will be "informationally biased" in the
sense that it tends largely to identify specific types of nonnegligent conduct
under the standard.
This informational bias could also lead to "rule evolution" over time, as
the information embodied in legal rules alters the nature of the rule itself.
Consider the medical malpractice example again. Negligence determinations today are made chiefly by referring to the custom of the profession.
The emergence and resilience of the custom rule in medical malpractice
may be in large part because the case law, defining so many specific types
of conduct deemed to be nonnegligent, has in effect generated the custom
rule to supplant the relatively ambiguous negligence test.' 8
A. Evolution of Efficient Legal Rules
That the law comes to favor the informed and meritorious party in
asymmetric information settings seems consistent with the common law
efficiency hypothesis. Legal rules in many contexts are ambiguous, depending on terms such as "reasonableness." Where the rules are not ambiguous,
they may need to be updated over time to reflect changes in tastes or
technology. The litigation process described in this model permits this to
occur in a manner that could enhance the efficiency of legal rules. The party
in a legal dispute who is likely to be in the best position to improve the
efficiency of a legal rule is the party that is both informed and meritorious.
18. The custom rule in medical malpractice serves as an example of a highly
specific negligence rule that is probably efficient. Leaving it up to the individual
court to determine negligence under a general cost-benefit test would be administratively expensive and could easily generate too much uncertainty to provide
guidance to physicians. Moreover, market pressures already encourage physicians
to adopt methods that are efficient in the sense of minimizing the sum of the costs of
accidental injuries and accident avoidance.
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Common law rules develop through four processes. One is the original
articulationof a rule, when a court announces a rule for the first time. Another
is the applicationof an existing rule to a set of facts, which helps to determine
the meaning and scope of the rule. A third is the distinguishingof one case from
another in a way that modifies an earlier established rule.19 A fourth is the
overruling of an earlier established rule.
The application process is the easiest one to examine in terms of this
article's model. Consider the negligence rule of tort law. In early judicial
opinions the negligence rule is described as requiring reasonable conduct
on the part of the defendant. In modern opinions the rule is sometimes
described as a cost-benefit test, under which courts compare the incremental losses that could be avoided by additional care with the cost of that
care. Judge Learned Hand described the test as a comparison between, on
one hand, the burden of additional precaution and, on the other hand, the
probability of harm multiplied by the severity of the harm. 20 Richard
Posner has described the test as an economically efficient legal rule:
"When the cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational
profit-maximizing enterprise will pay tort judgments to accident victims
rather than incur the larger cost of avoiding liability. Furthermore, overall
economic value or welfare would be diminished rather than increased by
incurring a higher accident-prevention cost in order to avoid a lower
accident cost" (Posner, 1972, p. 33).
Anyone who has become involved even peripherally in litigation knows
that the social desirability of the negligence standard depends on how it is
implemented. If a court fails to measure the burden of precaution or the
expected marginal losses with acceptable accuracy, the negligence test will
result in inefficient outcomes, no matter how the test is framed verbally.
19. See Gennaioli and Shleifer (2005). Distinguishing introduces new facts or
conditions not incorporated into the earlier version of the rule. The model in this
article assumes that existing legal precedents are not so rigid that their application is

independent of any of the facts of a dispute, or that they are incapable of being
modified by the incorporation of new information regarding facts. If a particular
legal precedent were so rigid, a court would have to overrule it in order to modify
the law. Overruling (where it differs from distinguishing) would presumably require
litigants with unusually large stakes (Rubin model) to challenge the precedent. In
any event, common law rules are fact based; they serve as precedent only for cases
with similar facts.
20. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
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The litigation process, as described by this model, has the desirable feature
.of maximizing the likelihood that the negligence test will be applied in a
manner that is economically efficient.
The distinguishing process can also be described as efficiency-enhancing
under this model. Suppose several cases establish the rule that a dosage of
spinal anesthetic above a certain level (e.g., 8 milligrams) during a particular medical procedure (e.g., delivery) is negligence. A malpractice case
enters the court, and the doctor thinks that the facts of his case distinguish
it from previous cases (e.g., because his method of performing the procedure differs). 21 Because the doctor in such a dispute will have superior
information regarding the facts, he will tend to litigate to judgment and
win under this model (provided the facts have implications for the rule's
application to his case, which is always a condition in common law). The
trial outcomes will lead to rules distinguishing these cases from the rules
developed in earlier court decisions. Because doctors have information on
both the costs and benefits of alternative procedures, inefficiently broad
rules will tend to be selected for litigation. This is so because, when the
doctor decides whether his distinguishing facts imply innocence, it is the
perception that his conduct was socially desirable in light of those facts that
will encourage him to conclude he is innocent.
Even the process by which rules are articulated is likely to lead to efficient
rules as a result of the litigation described in this model. Although this model
is largely one of facts, rules occasionally will be articulated by courts as they
survey the sample of decisions on a particular type of dispute. The rules
synthesizing earlier, fact-based decisions will themselves be efficient because
they incorporate or encompass numerous efficient applications. 22
21. See, for example, Brune v. Belinkoff 235 N.E. 2d 793 (1968). Defendant
physician argued that use of a higher dosage of spinal anesthetic was not negligent
because the "supra fundi pressure" method of delivery used in his community
required a higher dosage. The physician lost the case.
22. Common law rules appear, generally, to be articulated in the course of
efforts to generalize or synthesize the results of earlier, fact-based decisions. Courts
seldom, if ever, announce a general rule in the absence of a sample of narrower,
fact-based decisions suggesting the general rule. For example, Judge Learned
Hand's articulation of the cost-benefit version of the negligence test was an effort
to provide a general rule that explains earlier case law. Similarly, the strict liability
rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H. L. 330 (1868), was an effort to provide a
general rule that explained a sample of fact-based decisions concerning straying
animals, invading odors, and bursting reservoirs.
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B. Evolution of Inefficient Legal Rules
The information biasing that occurs in this model could have an
undesirable influence on the law. Suppose the parties agree on the
merits (facts and law) and disagree on their estimates of the likelihood
of judicial error. The difference in their predictions can be expressed as
Pp

- Pd = W(Qld - Qip) +

(1

-

W)(Q2p

-

Q2d) + Cp -

Ed,

(20)

which implies that uncertainty pushing parties to litigate can be decomposed into white noise and differences in estimates of the judicial error
probabilities. Since I am not assuming informational asymmetry with
respect to the merits of a lawsuit, the Priest-Klein analysis applies to
this case. I will treat the Priest-Klein case as the benchmark against
which this case is compared. As a preliminary matter, note that if the
judge's prejudices were well known, the litigants' judicial-error predictions would be the same (Qip = Qld,Q2p = Q2d) and white noise would
drive the litigation process, as in the Priest-Klein model.23
Suppose the plaintiff is both relatively optimistic as to the likelihood of
an erroneous finding of liability against an innocent defendant
(Q2p > Q2d) and relatively pessimistic as to the likelihood of an error

favoring a guilty defendant (Qld Qp). This is the case of plaintiff
relative optimism with respect to judicial errors. The probability of litigation is

f = 1 - +(

[W(Q(d - p~
[ivQ~o

1-

-)

2p -

Q2d)](\

(21)

+ vd-2p

Since the difference between the litigants' rational predictions (the second
term in the numerator) is positive, the probability of litigation is greater
than in the Priest-Klein (white noise) case.

23. The other case in which prejudices would not influence litigation is when
the prejudice-induced optimism of the nonfrivolous plaintiff (overestimating his
chance that prejudicial error advantages him) is perfectly offset by the prejudiceinduced pessimism (underestimating his chance that prejudicial error advantages
him) of the innocent defendant (W(Qld - QIp) + 0 - W)(Q2p - Q2d) = 0), again
leaving white noise as the sole uncertainty component leading to litigation.
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Implications for the evolution of legal standards depend on whether
relatively optimistic plaintiffs have valid beliefs. Suppose the plaintiffs
relative optimism is valid (e.g., plaintiff has private information on the
judge's prejudices that is not available to defendant). Since the defendant's
prediction of the plaintiffs probability of success is always too low relative
to the best prediction, the error variance distribution for the defendant is to
the right of that for the plaintiff, as shown in Figure 2. The sum of the error
variances reaches a maximum between 50% (maximum variance estimate for
plaintiff) and the maximum variance estimate of the defendant. The plaintiff
win rate, determined by the point at which the sum of prediction-error
variances reaches a maximum (point A, Figure 2), exceeds 50%.24
Information biasing that occurs because of the plaintiffs superior
knowledge regarding judicial prejudices should be a fragile, short-run
phenomenon. If defendants consistently do worse then they expect in
court, they will adjust their expectations downward, until the 50% win
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Figure 2. Prediction error variance distributions when plaintiffs relative
optimism with respect to judicial errors is valid.

24. The intuitive story here is that the defendant is relatively pessimistic from
the plaintiff's perspective and relatively optimistic from his own. He refuses to settle
cases that a better-informed defendant would settle, and as a result loses more
frequently.
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rate is reestablished. 25 If the assumptions are reversed, so that the defendant is relatively optimistic and has the information advantage in predicting judicial error, the short-run result will be a plaintiff win rate less than
50%, and this would hold until plaintiffs adjusted their expectations. 26
Holding to the assumption that the plaintiff has private information on
the likelihood ofjudicial error and is relatively optimistic in the sense defined
above, what does this model imply for the evolution of legal standards? Since
the plaintiff win rate exceeds 50% in the short run, the legal standard will
appear to be biased in favor of the plaintiff and will be modified in the short
run to incorporate judicial biases favoring the plaintiff.
One can think of this case as a failure of the rule of law. Insiders gain
knowledge of the prejudices of judges, or perhaps influence those prejudices, and legal rules are distorted in their favor as a result. The law
becomes less predictable to those unaware of the judges' biases. Since
rules are modified in the short run to incorporate judicial biases, inefficient
legal rules are likely to result.
C. Rule Evolution Generally (Three Processes)
In the general case in which the litigants' perceptions of the merits and
the likelihood of judicial error differ, the difference in the litigants' predictions of the probability of plaintiff success can be expressed as
Pp -Pd =(p
+ (

- Wd) (I -

(Qd
I - Qlp)
Ild - Q2d)
- Fd
- W)(Q2p - Q2d) +p

(22)

Thus, the uncertainty that pushes parties into litigation can be decomposed into parts reflecting differential information with respect to the
merits (facts and law), differential information with respect to the
25. An exception might be observed in the case where one side is a one-shot
player and the other a repeat player. Consider, again, the example of local product
liability lawyers going against an out-of-state seller. The one-shot player (out-ofstate seller) may not gain sufficient experience to adjust its expectations on the
likelihood of prejudice-induced error.
26. Obviously, there are other cases to consider, in which the results follow
easily from this argument: where the plaintiff has the information advantage and is
relatively pessimistic (regarding plaintiffs likelihood of success), and where the
defendant has the information advantage and is relatively pessimistic (regarding
plaintiffs likelihood of success).
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likelihood of judicial error (e.g., insider knowledge of judicial biases), and
white noise.
In this model of short run evolution, there are three evolutionary
processes suggested: asymmetric information, favoring the party that is
both informed and meritorious; asymmetric access, favoring the party
with better knowledge of judicial prejudices; and white noise, favoring
neither party and exhibiting high short-run indeterminacy. All three processes may be at work at any time.
These three processes connect to long-standing arguments in the law
literature. Oliver Wendell Holmes argued that legal standards become
more certain or predictable over time, as a consequence of litigation. 27 The
asymmetric information and white noise processes are consistent with this
view. Bentham, on the other hand, argued that common law was inherently
uncertain and unpredictable, and always subject to official discretion
(Postema, 1986). The asymmetric access process generates short-run evolution consistent with Bentham's view of the litigation process.
The common law efficiency hypothesis is a relatively recent development in the legal evolution literature. The dominant theory, due to Rubin,
is one of long-run evolutionary pressure, driven by differences in litigants'
stakes rather than information. Inefficient legal rules are challenged more
frequently than efficient legal rules, and, as a result, are more likely to be
overturned. The model in this article is easily reconcilable with Rubin's.
The three short-run processes identified in this model could coexist with
long-run pressure toward efficiency. Indeed, this model's finding that the
content of common law is disproportionately influenced by informed and
meritorious litigants provides more support to the efficiency thesis. 28
More recent literature has replaced the common law efficiency hypothesis with a bidding model in which common law is under pressure to favor
the parties with both a long-term stake in a specific legal rule and the

27. Holmes (1881), 111-29.
28. Of the three short-run processes identified here, the asymmetric-access
process has potentially troubling implications for the efficiency thesis. If common
law rules are under constant short-term pressure to be distorted to favor insiders,
then it is difficult to see how an efficient rule could last long. On the other hand, the
asymmetric-access process, as noted earlier, is the most fragile of the three identified
in this model-because outsiders (e.g., those who do not have information on judicial
prejudices) will adjust their expectations until the white noise process emerges.
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resources to litigate in their interests. The result of this pressure could be an
efficient or inefficient rule. For present purposes, the key thing to note
about the bidding model is that it is simply a version of the stakes model.
The information-based model presented here has implications that modify those of the bidding model. The most interesting is suggested by the
combination of the bidding model (as a description of long run evolution)
and the asymmetric information process as a description of short-term
pressure. The short-term biasing in favor of informed and meritorious
litigants that occurs under the asymmetric information process provides a
countervailing force against the long-term pressure toward an inefficient rule
under the bidding model. As section 4 of this article shows, even in the case of
asymmetric stakes, the case law's information content continues to be biased
in favor of the informed and meritorious litigant. Because of this information
biasing, the common law process has an inbuilt brake on the degree to which
interest groups can use it to establish inefficient rules.
D. Pace of Legal Change
J. Robert S. Prichard (1988) argued that the rules governing the allocation of legal expenses affect the pace of legal change. Prichard suggested
that British law is more rule-based and predictable because the British rule
for allocating legal costs (loser pays) acts as a subsidy for litigation.
Litigation, because it occurs more frequently, leads to a more steady
pace of rule clarification, a process in which legal change appears to be
marginal and conservative in comparison to the American legal system.
It is straightforward to show in this model that the British rule on legal
expenses generates a higher frequency of litigation. The more interesting
question is how this affects the three evolutionary processes identified here.
Consider first the white noise (Priest-Klein) process. More frequent and
cheaper litigation implies that the degree of uncertainty necessary to generate
litigation falls. Although the resulting law appears to move with equal likelihood in a pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant direction, the shifts are more frequent and of smaller magnitude. Rule clarification occurs in a smoother, more
continuous way, as Prichard claimed. Similarly, under the asymmetric information process, the law's apparent shift in favor of the informed and meritorious party would occur in a more continuous fashion. Under the asymmetric
access process, rules are distorted more consistently by official discretion.
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Georgakapoulos (1999) presents a model of legal evolution in which
common law generates smoother, more continuous change in legal rules
than statute law. Assuming risk aversion and switching costs, he argues
that common law is preferable to statute law, given the necessity for law to
keep up with changes in tastes and technology. The argument formalizes
that of Leoni (1961, pp. 59-96). The same argument can be applied to this
analysis of legal change. Assuming risk aversion or costs to conforming to
changes in the law, the British rule is preferable to the American rule.

7. Conclusion
Theories of legal evolution fall into two categories: judicial-effort and
evolutionary theories. Evolutionary models, in turn, are either ones
describing long-run evolutionary pressure, most of them building on the
seminal article of Rubin (1977), or short-run evolutionary analyses such as
that of Priest (1980). This article has advanced the short-run evolutionary
analysis by presenting a model that includes both Priest-Klein and asymmetric information models as special cases.
The short-run evolutionary model here does not suggest a clear trend
toward efficient rules, as was first argued by Rubin in his discussion of
long-run pressures. However, the model does show how private information
becomes embodied in legal rules over time, which is a key part of the common
law efficiency theories dating back to Hume and, more recently, Hayek.

Appendix
Proof that

w-

vf(v)dv

lr =

(Al)

0

Integrating by parts,

fr = F(1) -

F(v)dv

(A2)

0

Since f is symmetric around v = 1/2, the cumulative distribution can be
graphed as follows:
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Moreover, it is sufficient, for (A4) to hold, that
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or, equivalently,

Since the first and third terms on the right cancel, we have
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(A8)

which holds, because fi >fG for 0 < v < 1.g

Stakes Model
Priest-Klein Case. The following argument shows that the plaintiff win
rate exceeds (is less than) 50% if plaintiff (defendant) has greater stakes.
Under Priest-Klein assumptions P' = P' = 1/2, and the probability of
litigation function is

f(v)

=

-4
0,(V)

+ (1

-)2o(v) -

2(1 - 3)p

(A9)

where the variance terms reach a maximum at v = 1/2. Taking the derivative of
f and evaluating at v = 1/2, the sign of the derivative is simply the sign of fl.
Thus, if the plaintiff has greater stakes, 3> 0, and the frequency of litigation is
maximized at some v > 1/2. Similarly, if the defendant has greater stakes, S < 0,
and the frequency of litigation reaches a maximum at v < 1/2. E
Asymmetric Information Case. The following argument shows that the

implications of the asymmetric information continue to hold in the asymmetric information scenario. Suppose the defendant has the informational
advantage. If the defendant is innocent, litigation occurs when
C
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If the defendant is guilty, litigation occurs when
p - (1 -
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The frequency of litigation is greater when the defendant is innocent if
W(l - Qi- Q2) - OQ2> (W- 1)(0 - Q2) +13(1 - Q1), which holds,
given that 1 < 1. It follows that in the case in which stakes are asymmetric
and the defendant has the informational advantage fJfG > 1. Now suppose
the plaintiff has the informational advantage. When the plaintiffs case is
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meritorious, litigation occurs when
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When the plaintiffs case is not meritorious, litigation occurs when
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Clearly, litigation is more likely to occur when the plaintiffs case is
meritorious, and this is so whatever the value of P. Hence, when stakes
are asymmetric and the plaintiff has the informational advantage,
ft/fG> i.E
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